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Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of 
Cognitive Ethology, xxi + 209pp., MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1997. 
 
In Species of Mind, Colin Allen, a philosopher, and Marc Bekoff, an 
ethologist, defend and sketch out suggestions for a ‘cognitive ethology’, a 
discipline bringing the fruits of the cognitive revolution in psychology to 
the field of ethology. When one reads in the preface their description of this 
projected discipline as involving a ‘comparative, evolutionary, and 
ecological study of animal thought processes, beliefs, rationality, 
information processing, and consciousness’ (p. ix), one gets an immediate 
sense of the ambitiousness of the project as well as the range of opposing 
views with which it will have to engage. 
  
Skepticism at the idea that animals think, reason and are conscious seems to 
have been the ‘official’ view throughout the duration of western culture. 
Aristotle had thought of reasoning as the capacity to ‘perceive universals’, 
and had understood this as a distinctly human capacity. After this, as many 
have pointed out, the Christian account of creation seemed to drive human 
and non-human forms of existence even further apart. One may think that 
the more recent scientific displacement of humans from the centre of 
creation may have aided the idea of the continuity of mindedness across the 
species, but in this century science had tended to cut both ways in relation 
to this question. 
 
Early in the century the behaviourist revolution tended to level the 
difference between human and non-human psychology by eliminating the 
mind as a bearer ‘thought processes’, ‘beliefs’, and ‘consciousness’ for all. In 
light of this, the discovery of animal mentality has had to wait upon the 
rediscovery of the human mind, a process that many see as starting with 
the ‘cognitive revolution’ which has marked the last third of the century. 
Behaviourism had always had its critics for whom its apparent dismissal of 
human mindedness was counter-intuitive, but it wasn’t its 
counterintuitiveness that led to its eclipse, but rather its inability to 
adequately account for various aspects of human behaviour. ‘Mentalism’ 
came back in the form of the postulation of mental processes involving 
‘representations’ posited to explain forms of behaviour that had escaped 
Animal Issues, Vol.3, No.2, 1999 
 64 
the very limited explanatory repertoire of behaviourism. With the re-
establishment of human mentality, a general adherence to Darwinism 
would surely suggest that this explanatory approach could then be 
extended to the behaviour of other than human animals. Here, however, it 
will be recalled that one of the first blows struck against the behaviourist 
orthodoxy in the late 1950s was Chomsky’s critique of the ability of 
Skinnerian behaviourism to account for a type of behaviour that, in 
Chomsky's view, is uniquely human – linguistic behaviour. Since then, in 
various disciplines including philosophy, the thesis that ‘higher’ cognitive 
functions depend upon a uniquely human linguistic competence, the thesis 
that ‘thought needs talk’, has emerged as a popular basis for the continued 
skepticism towards the idea of animal minds. 
  
The sketch above of course over-simplifies what can often seem to be a 
chaotic jumble of views characterising late 20th century views of the mind, 
and the authors’ presentation of a clear and cogent case for cognitive 
ethology against this chaotic background is in general one of the real 
achievements of this book. As they point out, at its beginning ethology was 
already ‘cognitive’ with the work of Darwin and his follower George 
Romanes. As such, however, it was limited to a somewhat anecdotal and 
uncritical ascription of mentality to animals, and came to be regarded as 
unscientific with the onset of behaviourism in this century. With the later 
decline of behaviourism, the issue of animal mentality returned to the scene 
most forcefully, perhaps, with the work of Donald Griffin. But while 
sympathetic to the broad goals of Griffin’s work, Allen and Bekoff agree 
with his critics who argue that his attribution to non-human animals of 
intentionality and consciousness remains uncritical and anecdotal. Allen 
and Bekoff see their goal as that of using advances in recent philosophy of 
mind and cognitive science to suggest ways in which mentalistic 
approaches to animal behaviour might be tested, and this results in an 
approach that is admirably open and non-dogmatic. Anyone interested in 
the issue of animal mindedness will, I'm sure, find the book interesting and 
enlightening. Moreover, by bringing conceptual and empirical issues 
together in making their case, the authors fruitfully open up the issues of 
human consciousness and intentionality to new ways of thinking as well, 
and so the relevance of the book goes beyond the brief the authors have set 
for themselves.  
 
Thematically, Species of Mind falls roughly into two halves. From chapters 1 
to 5 Allen and Bekoff cover in a clear way the relevant background material 
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needed for understanding exactly what will be at issue when proposals for 
a cognitive ethology are later defended. Such coverage is by necessity 
synoptic, but these early chapters provide helpful overviews of an array of 
complexly intertwining disciplines in a way that makes them accessible for 
the general reader. Successively, after sketching out their interdisciplinary 
approach, they present a brief history of classical and cognitive ethology, 
discuss the methodological problems inherent in describing behaviour, 
sketch the main forms of objection to the scientificity of a cognitive 
ethology, survey the disputes over the role of ‘folk psychological’ 
explanations (that is, explanations of behaviour invoking beliefs and 
desires) in scientific psychology, and problems facing their extension to the 
realm of non-human behaviour.  
 
This last issue, dealt with in chapter 5, is effectively the turning point of the 
book, and in chapters 6 and 7 the authors discuss two forms of animal 
behaviour which they see as sufficiently complex to require a cognitive 
approach, specifically an approach that appeals to intentional contents in its 
explanations. These behaviours are those of social play on the one hand, 
and antipredatory behaviour on the other. As mentioned, the focus here is 
that of a purported animal intentionality, and in particular, on whether the 
explanation of these forms of behaviour requires attributing to animals 
‘higher-order’ forms of intentionality, for example, an animal's having 
beliefs about the beliefs of other animals. In the following chapter they shift 
to the issue of consciousness, arguing that a functional approach to 
consciousness in the context of the strategy of inference to the best 
explanation may settle questions about consciousness which are often not 
thought to be empirically tractable. In the final chapter, besides pulling the 
various threads together, the authors illustrate their own approach by 
resuming a dispute with critics who have challenged the possibility of 
using intentionalistic descriptions of animal behaviour in ethological 
contexts. 
  
While such debates about animal mentality are never far from hotly 
contested ethical and political issues concerning the treatment of animals, 
here, such disputes remain largely in the background, and perhaps 
congruent with this is the fact that the authors have focused more upon the 
issue of animal intentionality rather than that of consciousness. (This latter 
tends to come to the fore in ethical debates because of the question as to 
whether animals feel pain.) This seems to me to be a wise decision. 
Although the authors have interesting things to say regarding the concept 
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of consciousness, one is left with the impression that the issue of 
intentionality is the more tractable from this perspective and that the 
clarification of consciousness is more likely to follow progress made in the 
understanding of intentionality than vice-versa. 
 
As I have mentioned, it would seem that the front on which the authors are 
going to have to defend their thesis most strongly is that of the whether or 
not thought requires talk. (Among recent similar books which are skeptical 
of animal mentality on this basis, see, for example, Euan Macphail’s The 
Evolution of Consciousness,1 Stephen Budiansky's If a Lion Could Talk.2 In 
philosophy, this idea has been advocated by thinkers as different as (the 
later) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Donald Davidson, and Martin Heidegger.) My 
feeling was that this was not perhaps dealt with as directly as it may have 
been. (The authors acknowledge on page 54, that, in this work at least, they 
do not intend to become embroiled in disputes ‘about what constitutes a 
language’, but one wonders if such disputes can really be avoided). Perhaps 
these issues are most directly addressed in chapter 5 where the authors 
engage with one form of this objection when they address the skepticism of 
Dennett and Stich over the idea of attribution of concepts to animals. Here 
the authors’ frustration with philosophers' tendency to believe such issues 
can be settled in isolation from actual empirical research is apparent, both 
Stich and Dennett restricting their empirical base to the behaviour of that 
much studied canid, ‘Fido’. As Allen and Bekoff point out, the Dennett-
Stich argument runs along the following sorts of lines. We commonly say 
things like ‘Fido wants a piece of steak’, or ‘Fido was trying to catch the 
squirrel’, but are we really justified in attributing concepts like ‘steak’ or 
‘squirrel’ to animals? Isn’t it the case that to say that Fido has the concept 
‘steak’ under which he can classify that thing in his dinner dish 
misleadingly suggests that he understands the contents of his dish as being 
part of a butchered animal? After all, that is part of what is contained in the 
concept ‘steak’. But this move, the authors respond, stacks the deck against 
the case for animal mentality by shifting from the issue of whether Fido has 
a concept of that which is in his dish to whether he has our, English, 
concept.  
 
But this response does not seem to meet the criticism at the depth at which 
it is intended to operate. What Dennett, Stich and others mean by ‘concept’ 
is  something that by its very nature will stand in constitutive relations to 
                                                 
1 Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998. 
2 New York, The Free Press, 1998. 
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other concepts. In short, to attribute a concept to an organism is to attribute 
to it the sort of inferential activity which conceptual structures allow, 
concepts being, as it were, those very hinges upon which inferences turn. 
Whatever analogue of the English concept ‘steak’ (call it ‘steak-F’) that one 
attributes to Fido, it will stand in some connections with other concepts just 
in virtue of its being a concept. And this means that attributing to Fido the 
belief that x is ‘steak-F’ means that one is committed to attributing a pile of 
other beliefs to Fido that he knows by inference. It is the idea that only 
representational media as rich and as articulated as those of human 
languages are capable of supporting that kind of inferential activity that is 
the basic idea involved in the ‘thought-needs-talk’ thesis (at least many 
versions of it — Davidson's, for example).  
 
It is around this basis for skepticism that, it seems to me, the authors’ 
replies pull in two different directions, one helpful, one less so. In places 
they seem keen to support the idea that the conceptualized content 
attributable to animals should be thought of as analogous to that the type of 
propositional content commonly attributed to humans. Thus they invoke a 
Duhem-Quine style conceptual holism in criticism of Griffin’s way of 
attributing beliefs to animals one by one on the basis of individual 
behaviours (pp. 50 and 172), and even seem to suggest some type of 
translation of canid concepts into English with the idea that ‘the 
differentiations of dictionary English’ might be manipulated ‘so as to 
delineate the contents of the dog’s brain’ (p. 81). These are points at which 
they are most likely to meet rejoinders based on the ‘thought-needs-talk’ 
idea. On the other hand they pursue a direction of thought using Ruth 
Garrett Millikan’s suggestive functionalist analyses of concepts based in the 
notion of ‘intentional icon’. This latter direction linking mental states and 
communicative systems might offer a less contentious way of pursuing 
questions of animal ‘intentionality’ and its relation to the capacities we 
attribute to humans when we speak in that way. With the usual 
philosophical approaches to human intentionality that tend to trade 
exclusively in propositional contents, the question of whether on not 
animals have intentionality seems an all or nothing affair. In contrast, 
Millikan’s focus on the ‘iconic’ features of human language brings out 
features which, along with Peircean ‘indices, human languages share with 
communicative systems used by other species, even if those systems do not 
contain genuine Peircean ‘symbols’. Even if it is the case that human 
communicative and intentional systems have features not found elsewhere, 
this should not obscure the extent to which such systems might be 
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understood as continuous with those of the non-human animal world. The 
cognitive ethology advocated by Allen and Bekoff promises a way of 
understanding the sense in which non-human animals may be said to be 
minded, but it also promises a less anthropocentric understanding of the 
nature of human mindedness itself. 
 
 
Paul Redding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
